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INTRODUCTION
Among the many crises facing the former Soviet republics
of Central Asia as they make the transition from centrally-
planned provinces of the Soviet Union to independent
states, none is more urgent than the management of water
resources, both across national borders and within the new
sovereign states.  Inefficient use of irrigation water,
combined with the Soviet collectivization of agriculture,
has led to the disaster of the shrinking of the Aral Sea, to
salinization of vast areas of once-fertile land, and to the
impoverishment of thousands of Central Asian farmers.  It
is also the cause of ongoing and dangerous diplomatic
strains between upstream and downstream countries.
In Kazakhstan, the largest of the Central Asian Republics,
the economic and political reforms that followed the
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 included the abrupt
privatization of the huge collective farms that had
produced a significant share of the Soviet system’s cotton,
wheat, and other crops.  Although most of the state farms
were initially privatized in name only, with workers
becoming members of “private” cooperatives that
remained unchanged from the state farms in every other
way, over the past half decade thousands of individual
workers have broken away to form their own small
independent farms.  Where a single state farm once
managed everything from input purchasing to output
marketing, dozens or hundreds of small farmers now strive
to establish profitable businesses on their own— while still
relying on infrastructure and institutions designed to serve
the state farm.
In the past two years, the attention of the Kazakhstani
government and of international lenders like the W orld
Bank and the Asian Development Bank has focused on
rehabilitating, and possibly privatizing, the irrigation and
drainage infrastructure that services the newly private
farms.  Irrigation management transfer and cost recovery
for the irrigation system are among the most difficult
challenges facing the national government, local
agriculture and water management officials, and, most of
all, the farmers.1
This paper describes one answer to the challenge of
irrigation water management at the local level.  In late
1996, a small group of independent farmers in Shu Raion,
an agricultural district in southern Kazakhstan some 350
km west of the city of Almaty, came together to establish
the Shu Water User Association (WUA).2   Roughly a
third of the independent farmers who possess irrigated
land in Shu Raion belong to the Shu WUA.  The members
of the Shu WUA share a secondary irrigation canal that
was once entirely within the boundaries of a single state
farm.  Forming a water user association was these farmers’
response to the challenge of purchasing and allocating
irrigation water after the disintegration of the  state farm. 
The Shu W UA is one of the oldest registered WUAs in
Kazakhstan, perhaps even the oldest.  Although it is a
small organization with very limited responsibilities, our
interviews showed that it is achieving its objectives and is
providing measurable benefits to its members.  At a time
when Kazakhstan is taking on millions of dollars in debt
to rehabilitate its irrigation and drainage infrastructure, a
local farmers’ organization that is successfully managing
its own irrigation system is worth further investigation.  
The rest of this case study is organized as follows.  First,
we trace the background of Jhambyl State Farm and
describe how it was privatized.  In the next section, we
examine the irrigation system in the area, discuss water
allocation and charges, outline the structure and functions
of the government agency responsible for managing the
irrigation system, and describe the relationship between
this agency and the farmers.  We then take a close look at
the Shu Water User Association.  The following sections
discuss the agricultural economy in the Raion, focusing on
agricultural production, incomes, debt, access to credit,
and the use of barter .  The case study concludes with some
implications of the Shu WUA’s experience for the future
of irrigation management in Kazakhstan.
PRIVATIZATION OF JHAMBYL STATE FARM
Before the privatization of Kazakhstani agriculture began
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in 1993, there were fifteen Sovkhozy  (state farms) in Shu
Raion.3  One of the largest was Jhambyl State  Farm, with
an area of 9,728 hectares.  Prior to 1980, Jhambyl State
Farm irrigated about 1,500 hectares.  After a reservoir was
added on the Shu River, the farm expanded its irrigated
area to 5,248 hectares.  No drainage system was
constructed, however, and salinization began almost
immediately.  In the following years some land was taken
out of production as a result of salinization, particularly in
the low-lying areas that had  been irrigated the longest.
The main crop at Jhambyl State Farm was beets, which
were produced primarily for processing into sugar.  The
farm also raised wheat and melons and kept 35,000 sheep,
1,800 cattle, and 700 horses.  It employed some 630
workers, including engineers, agronomists, accountants,
cooks, construction workers, farm laborers, and herders.
If we assume an average family size of five (probably a
low estimate), the farm provided a livelihood for more
than 3,000 people.
Jhambyl State Farm began to break up in 1991, when
Kazakhstan passed its initial legislation on agricultural
privatization.4  By 1995, it had become the Jhambyl
Cooperative Farm, a private, commercial corporation and
one of nineteen cooperative farms that replaced the fifteen
state farms in the Raion.5  Many of Jhambyl State Farm’s
workers broke away from the cooperative at this time to
become independent peasant farmers.  The Raion now has
613 independent farmers, and the number continues to
grow.  Only about a quarter of those  possess irrigated
lands, however (the rest are livestock herders).
During the privatization process, land belonging to the
state farm was allocated to families according to a formula
devised by a “land commission” created by the farm.
Active and retired farm workers each received 2.63
irrigated hectares.  Civil servants who worked on the farm
(teachers, hospital employees, etc.) received 1.82 irrigated
hectares each.  Finally, children and people who lived on
the farm but were employed elsewhere received 0.23
irrigated hectares each.  The formula favored larger
families, who received an allocation for each adult and
child in the family.  The farmers we interviewed had farms
of 6, 8, 12, 14, and 20 hectares for an average of 12
hectares.  The quality of the specific pieces of land
assigned to an individual depended on the number of years
he or she had worked on the state farm.  In addition to
land, each state farm worker received a nominal share in
the farm's capital stock:  buildings, equipment, tools,
livestock, etc.
 
Workers who wanted to leave the state farm and establish
their own peasant farms received land adjacent to one
another along a single irrigation canal, so that independent
farms now adjoin one another, rather than being
interspersed among fields belonging to the cooperative.
This created entire irrigation services areas that are
occupied by independent farmers—and where the
formation of water user associations is thus geographically
feasible.  Between 1993 and  1998, 128 workers left the
state farm (or cooperative farm, after 1995) to become
independent farmers. 
Jhambyl Cooperative Farm now employs about 250
workers, distributed among 350 households, for a total of
roughly 1,750 people.  Despite the reduction in its
workforce, it remains the largest farming entity in Shu
Raion.  It currently irrigates 2 ,500  hectares, which is
roughly half of its irrigab le land.  The remaining land is
left unused due to salinization and a shortage of
equipment, fuel, and labor.  As members of the
cooperative leave to  become independent farmers, taking
their land with them, its area and assets are steadily
shrinking.  The cooperative has just 264 sheep and 53
horses left from the former state farm’s herds of
thousands, and its capital stock and soil base are
deteriorating.  No new equipment has been purchased
since privatization, and the existing equipment is poorly
maintained.  No commercial fertilizer or pesticides have
been used for the past three years, because their cost
exceeds the  price of the crops produced.  
Crop yields are  down, though perhaps not as dramatically
as might be expected.  The former state farm produced an
average of 1.1-1.2 tons of wheat per hectare, and achieved
yields as high as 1.8-2.1 tons per hectare in good years.
Last year, production on the cooperative plummeted to
0.55 tons/hectare, but it recovered this year to 1.0
tons/hectare.6  Beets, which were the main crop of the
former state farm, have been entirely replaced with wheat,
as beets have become too expensive to grow.  In 1998, the
cooperative produced 1,485  tons of wheat, along with
melons, onions, and other fruits and vegetables.  Last year
these products were exported to Russia, but by the 1998
harvest the Russian financial crisis had eliminated the
market there, and the melons and onions were  left to rot in
the fields.
Cooperative members also have their own land, and
production on these individual plots—of crops and
livestock— accounts for more than half of most
households’ total income.  
IRRIGATION IN SHU RAION
The Irrigation System
Shu Raion has both irrigated and non-irrigated agriculture.
Irrigation water is drawn from the Tasotkel Reservoir,
which was built in 1981 and is fed by the Shu River.
Three main irrigation canals lead 39 kilometers north from
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the reservoir to the 36,000 hectares of irrigated farmland
in Shu Raion.  All irrigation is surface, and only one of the
three main canals is lined.  The chief engineer of the local
water management authority estimates that an average of
30 percent of the water drawn from the reservoir is lost in
these main canals.
Branching off the three main canals are a number of
secondary canals.  Some of the secondary canals are lined.
Before the privatization of agricultural land, each
secondary canal provided water to  an area within the
boundaries of a single large state farm.  Each secondary
canal now serves anywhere from one to several dozen
private entities, includ ing independent farms and
cooperatives.  As a result of a severe shortage of funds for
equipment and labor, the local water management
authority is not able to maintain the irrigation system
adequately.  The flow capacity of the canals is shrinking as
they fill with sediment and become choked with reeds.
The main canal, which is an earthen ditch with a concrete
lining, has cracked in many places, leading to the level of
water losses indicated above. 
Salinization has become a problem in some parts of the
Raion.  Few farms have any drainage infrastructure.  The
oldest irrigated areas, which are in the lowlands along the
Shu River, are seriously affected by salinization.  In
upland areas, where there is a natural drainage system and
where irrigation began later, salinization is not yet a
serious problem.
The Local W ater M anagement Authority
The irrigation system in Shu is managed by the raion-level
office of the Oblast Committee for Water Resources,
which is in turn a branch of the State Committee for Water
Resources, a department of Kazakhstan’s Ministry of
Agriculture.  The raion-level office, called the Raionnoe
Upravlenye Vodokhozaystvennykh Sistem, or UVS, has
three responsibilities:  delivering water to farms,
maintaining the primary irrigation system, and collecting
payment of water charges.  To deliver irrigation water, the
Shu UVS signs contracts with individual farming entities,
including the 19 cooperative farms, the water user
association, and the hundred or so other independent
farmers.  Before privatization, the UVS signed contracts
with only the 15 state farms in the raion.  The number of
individual contracts for which it is responsible has thus
increased by nearly nine times.
Ironically, the size of the UVS staff has varied inversely
with the number of contracts for which it is responsible.
The UVS's employees include engineers, hydrologists,
canal maintenance workers, water delivery regulators, and
drivers.  Before privatization, the UVS employed 150
workers; its workforce is now down to 60.  Most positions
are seasonal, with salaries paid only from April to
September.  Many of the UVS’s remaining employees are
on involuntary unpaid vacations because the UVS lacks
funds for their salaries.  Those salaries that are paid are
done so entire ly in kind, as the UVS simply passes on to
its employees the in-kind payments it receives for water
charges.  The UVS currently owes 3 million Tenge
($37,000) in back wages to  its staff.7
One of the UVS's main tasks is to collect payment from
farmers for the water delivered.  Water charges, which are
its sole source of revenue, are set by the UVS on the basis
of the volume of water delivered to the diversion points
along the main canals.  In 1998, the UVS charged farmers
0.0492 T enge per m3, down from .0783/m3 and .0538/m3
in 1996 and 1997, respectively.  Few farmers paid their
charges in full, however.  In 1998, charges for the water
delivered by the UVS totaled 9 million Tenge; payments,
which were all made in kind, totaled only 3 million Tenge.
A similar ratio prevailed in 1997:  charges for water
delivered were 16 million Tenge, but payments were only
6 million Tenge.  The accumulated debt to the UVS for
water delivered from 1996 to 1998 is now 35 million
Tenge ($437,000)—equivalent to about two years’
operating expenses for the UVS.
According to the UVS chief engineer, most of the debt is
owed by cooperative farms.  Independent farmers have a
better record of paying for their water.  In 1998, the UVS
delivered 12-15 million m3 to the Jhambyl Cooperative
Farm, which had paid 70 percent of its bill as of October.
The UVS has the right to cut off the water supply to
farmers who don 't pay, and it has cut off the WUA’s water
supply twice this year.  It has also taken two cooperative
farms to court to force them to pay, but without success.8
THE SHU WATER USER ASSOCIATION
Formation of the Water User Association
Thirty-seven of the 128 workers who have left the Jhambyl
State Farm or Jhambyl Cooperative Farm to become
independent peasant farmers over the past five years are
located along a secondary irrigation canal on 450 hectares
that were once a single unit of the former state farm.  In
late 1996, these 37 farmers established the Shu Water User
Association, one of the first self-governing organizations
of irrigators in Kazakhstan. 
The WU A’s canal and farms are laid out roughly as
illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1:  Layout of Jhambyl Cooperative Farm and the Shu WUA 
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According to the president of the Shu Water User
Association, the farmers had early on been thinking about
working together on a number of tasks, such as managing
irrigation water, purchasing inputs, and marketing
produce, because they were finding it difficult to
accomplish these tasks individually.  They decided  to
establish a water user association after attending a seminar
organized by the Harvard Institute for International
Development (HIID), the U.S. Agency for International
Development, and the Ministry of Agriculture.  In late
1996 HIID gave a small grant to the WU A to cover the
costs of registering the organization.9  
Early in 1997, all the farmers on the canal met and elected
as president a man who had spent ten years as an
agronomist and seed production expert on the former state
farm.  He was given responsibility for drafting a charter,
hiring a lawyer to prepare the necessary documents, and
registering the new organization, which cost about 12,400
Tenge ($155).10
The sole function of the Shu WUA is to secure irrigation
water for its members.  All the farmers we met emphasized
that they are independent in everything except securing
water, for which they rely on the W UA.  The basic reason
a water user association is needed in Shu is that there is no
technology for metering water deliveries to individual
farms on the secondary canal.  Water deliveries are
metered only at the diversion point from the main canal.
Before the W UA was formed, each independent farmer
had to sign a subcontract with the cooperative farm, which
charged for water according to the crops and number of
hectares planted.  The farmers joked that they never
bothered to pay the cooperative, but they still considered
the arrangement unsatisfactory, perhaps because it forced
them to  remain partly dependent on the cooperative.  
Once the W UA was established , it could  sign its own
contract directly with the UVS.  The W UA now takes
delivery of water, remits payment for it, and allocates the
water and fees among its members.  The members meet
roughly twice a year, in the spring when requests for water
have to be submitted to the UVS, and in the fall when
charges must be allocated and paid.  
It is clear that the farmers regard the ability to sign a
contract with the UVS as the main benefit conferred by the
WUA.  It is not the only one, however.  The farmers
acknowledged that even if they all had individual water
meters at their farm gates and could thus sign individual
water delivery contracts with the UVS, the water user
association would be needed to handle maintenance of the
canal and regulate the delivery of water to each farm.
They pointed out, moreover, that with 36,000 hectares of
irrigated land in the raion and an average independent
farm size of 12 hectares, the UVS will never be able to
handle its administrative load if each farmer contracts with
the UVS individually. 
Water Delivery along the WUA’s Canal
The secondary canal that serves the Shu WUA is a raised,
concrete trough.  Each farm has a short ditch or pipe that
leads from the secondary canal to the farm’s own
distribution network.  Canals on individual farms are
earthen ditches; none of them are lined.  Due to cracks in
the canal and o ther maintenance problems, about 30
percent of the water delivered from the main canal is lost
in the secondary canal.  There is no drainage system in the
service area of the Shu WUA.  Other farms in the raion do
have drainage, but the WU A’s land is located in an upland
area, and the farmers said that salinization is not a problem
for them.
Water delivered to the WUA’s secondary canal is metered
at the diversion point from the main canal, as noted above.
To manage water delivery, the WUA employs one of its
members as a hydrotechnician.  Each day the
hydrotechnician meets a representative of the UVS at the
diversion point and records the amount of water delivered.
WUA members have agreed  that the gates to their
individual farms will be opened only by the
hydrotechnician, or with his approval.  This ensures that
farms will receive only the amount of water considered
appropriate for their fields and crops, and it permits the
WUA to allocate charges for the water.  Each WUA
member pays the hydrotechnician, who is the  WUA’s only
employee, 15 Tenge per hectare per month for his services
(or a to tal of about $84 a  month). 
Ownership and Maintenance of the Canal
The WU A’s secondary canal is owned by Jhambyl
Cooperative Farm, as the  successor to the former state
farm.  On the books, all of the irrigation infrastructure
originally belonging to the Jhambyl State  Farm is currently
worth about 25 million T enge.  The WU A members we
interviewed believe that the state farm’s infrastructure was
vastly overvalued , however, and that their own canal is
almost worthless due to its poor condition.  The
cooperative would like the WUA to take ownership of the
canal in exchange for the shares of the cooperative's
physical capital still held by the WUA members.  The
WUA does not want to buy the canal, however, because it
is on the verge of collapsing.  Moreover, if the WUA owns
the canal, it will have to pay property taxes on it.  These
taxes are instead incurred by the cooperative.  The
cooperative is thus saddled with property tax obligations
for two secondary canals (its own and the WUA's), as well
as for all the shares (because individuals hold the shares,
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but the cooperative owns them).
Although they do not own the canal, the WUA members
who use it are responsible for its maintenance.  The WUA
assigns each farmer a section of the canal for cleaning, and
small leaks have been repaired.  No other investment in
routine maintenance has been made, however, and there
have been no repairs to  the canal since it was built in
1978.  The cost of repairing the canal is now estimated at
3 million Tenge ($37,500). 
Paying for Water
The WU A contracts with the UVS for water deliveries and
is responsible for the bill.  Each member of the WUA is
allocated a share of the charges based on the crops and
number of hectares he planted.  Charges for the water lost
in the secondary canal are also allocated  among members.
In 1998, the W UA received about 2 million m3 of water.
Its total cost for water was 129 ,000 Tenge ($1,612)—an
average of about 287 Tenge ($3.59) per hectare.11
As of November, 1998, the WUA had not paid any of its
bill to the UVS.  It had, however, paid all but 50,000
Tenge of last year’s water bill, which gave it a similar
payment record to that of Jhambyl Cooperative Farm, in
percentage terms.  The WUA’s contract with the UVS
states that if it cannot pay for water in cash, it must pay in
kind (barter).  Last year, the WUA paid its bill partly in
cash and partly in kind.  This year, it offered payment in
hay and watermelons, but they were not accepted by the
UVS.  The farmers said that the UVS will accept only
wheat flour as barter payment, and they hoped to deliver
some flour later in the fall.
In August, the UVS cut off water delivery to the WUA for
one week.  At the end of the week, WUA members
brought the UVS a written pledge to pay for their water,
and delivery was resumed.  The farmers said that their
water was cut off again in October, hindering the growth
of the winter wheat crop.  They hoped to resolve this
problem by spring, when the growing season begins.  The
WUA is not willing to cut off water to its own members
who have not paid, however.  The farmers explained that
this would be too damaging to their neighbors, who have
to produce crops if they are to survive.  
The WU A’s members argued that they receive no
s e r v ic e s—such  a s  c an a l  c l e an i ng  o r  o th e r
maintenance—from the UVS and  should therefore not be
obliged to pay the water charges.  They also said that they
have no idea how the charges were defined and
complained that they had no role in the  process.  Despite
this, the farmers all agreed that the cost of water is not a
factor in deciding which crops to grow.12
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND THE WUA
FA RM  EC ON OM Y
Crops and Yields
The thirty-seven farmers who comprise the Shu W ater
User Association have farms ranging in size from 3 to 27
hectares, with an average size of about 12 hectares (or 450
hectares in all).  Overall, about 15 percent  of  WUA land
was planted in wheat this year, 30 percent in hay, 50
percent in melons, and the rest in barley and maize.  The
size, crop choices, and yields this year for three typical
WU A farms are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1:  Crops and yields of WUA members
Farm size Crop Area planted Yield/hectare
Farm 1 Wheat 6 hectares 1.2 tons
14 hectares Hay 4 hectares 3 tons
Melons 1 hectare 11 tons
Fallow 3 hectares n.a.
Farm 2
12 hectares
Hay 12 hectares 6 tons
Farm 3
27 hectares (combined
farms of three bro thers)
Winter wheat
Hay
12 hectares
15 hectares
2 tons
12 tons 
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The differences in yields achieved by the members of the
WUA are caused in large part by differences in access to
machinery.13  One large WUA farm (Farm 3 in Table 1)
has a tractor and a planter.  Owning their own equipment
allows the farmers to plant and harvest at the right time,
rather than having to rent equipment when its owners are
not using it, and to harvest an extra hay crop.  The farmers
purchased the equipment second-hand, with cash obtained
from selling their livestock.  They make extra money by
renting the tractor out to other farmers; the rate is 1,000
Tenge per hectare, and the renter must provide his own
fuel.  Equipment can also be rented from “equipment
stations” run by the Shu Raion administration.  Among
themselves, the 37 WUA members own (individually) 12
tractors, 1 truck, and 10-15 planters.  They also all own
cars.14 
Most of the farmers keep  small numbers of horses, dairy
cows, beef cattle, and sheep.  It is more profitable to sell
animal products than crops, which is why so much land is
planted in fodder for livestock.  
Prices and Marketing
Once crops are harvested, farmers have three options:
consume them, sell them for cash, or barter them for other
goods or payment of debt.  The members of the WUA
seem to be largely self-sufficient in food;  they purchase
only fruit, tea, and perhaps a few other minor items.  We
will look more closely at the role  of barter in the local
economy below.  
Unlike the cooperative farm, the independent farmers sell
a significant share of their production for cash.  Wheat, the
most important cash crop, sells for 5 Tenge/kg in the Shu
market, or about $62/ton.  It is more profitable, however,
to take the wheat to the mill and have it processed into
flour, which sells for 16 Tenge/kg, even though the mill
keeps about a third of the flour it produces as payment for
its services.  Hay, which the farmers sell to Shu town
residents from their tractors, going door to door, sells for
about 2,000 Tenge/ton in the summer and  fall, and 3,000
Tenge/ton in the winter and spring, before the first crop is
harvested.  
The collapse of demand for Kazakhstani agricultural
products in Russia this year was a serious blow for farmers
in Shu Raion.  In the past, the farmers exported most of
their melons to southern Russia.  Each farmer arranged his
own transport for his crop, hiring trucks and drivers and
selling the melons to traders who would  take the cargo  to
Russia  to sell.  This year, there was no market for melons
there, and the farmers in the W UA left half their melon
crop in the fields to rot.  This loss was particularly harmful
because sales in Russia were a source of cash for the Shu
farmers, allowing them to pay for some inputs, such as
water, in cash.
Marketing their produce is a problem for the independent
farmers.  Each of them must make his own arrangements
for transporting his crops to a market and finding a buyer
there.  The WUA members agree that it would be more
profitable to market their  products jointly, but efforts to do
so last year fell through.  Joint marketing also requires
synchronization of planting, so that products are ready for
market at the same time.  WUA members hope to improve
their marketing practices next year.
Trucks are the main means of transporting products to the
market, and there are many trucks and drivers available for
hire.  Although Shu is the main railroad junction for all of
Central Asia—it is where the north-south line meets the
east-west line—and rail service is both cheaper and more
reliable than road transport in the former Soviet Union, the
farmers do not use the railroad.  Individual farmers do not
produce enough to fill an entire boxcar and—perhaps
more important— do not trust the railroad, as rail cargo has
been known to disappear or to be held indefinitely at
border crossings. 
Incomes
Using the prices and yields indicated above, Table 2
estimates the maximum potential cash revenues of the
three farms described in Table 1.  Most of the farmers also
have several other sources of household income, including
livestock, gardens, casual labor for the cooperative or
other farmers, and, if they own machinery, rental fees.
Most of the farms support a large number of
people— probably a minimum of one person for every two
hectares, given the formula for allocating land from the
former state farm.  We were not able to get a good
estimate of total household income or per capita income.
The profitability of the farms described above is also
uncertain. Costs—especially the cost of household
labor—are not fully accounted for by the  farmers.  Of the
three farms in Table 2, only the last one (farm 3) is
“profitable,” according to its owner.  
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Table 2:  Potential revenues of WUA farms
Farm Crop Total yield Price/ton Total price
Farm 1 Wheat 7.2 tons 5,000 Tenge 36,000 Tenge ($450)
Hay 12 tons 2,000 Tenge 24,000 Tenge ($300)
Melons 11 tons negligible negligible
Farm 2 Hay 72 tons 2,000 Tenge 144,000 Tenge ($1,800)
Farm 3 Winter wheat
Hay
24 tons
180 tons
5,000 Tenge
2,000 Tenge
120,000 Tenge ($1,500)
360,000 Tenge ($4,500)
For one 19.8-hectare WUA farm, financial flows in 1998
were as follows.  The farm produced 22 tons of seed
wheat, which was sold at the Shu market for 10,000-
12,000 Tenge/ton.  The farm also produced 15 tons of
maize, but since there is no market for maize, it was stored
on the farm for future sale or use.  There was also no
market for the melons the farm produced, and they were
left to rot in the fields.  The farm's total cash earnings for
its crops were thus on the order of 220,000 Tenge
($2,750).  Its cash costs, for water, taxes, equipment
rental, and fuel, were approximately 100,000 Tenge,
leaving the family—16 or 17 people—about 120,000
Tenge ($1,500) for consumer purchases during the year.
The family also raises a few livestock, fruit trees, and a
vegetable garden.  Livestock products and fruits and
vegetables probably allow the family to subsist almost
entirely on their own production.  In addition, the farmer
receives a share of the cooperative 's production, as he is
still a cooperative member, and his wife receives a pension
of 4,100 Tenge per month ($51).  The farmer said that his
farm is doing well:  it is able to  pay for its inputs, and it
does produce an income for the family.
BARTER, DEB T, AN D CREDIT
In any conversation with farmers and local officials in Shu
Raion, three issues come up  immediately:  the use of barter
for payment of bills; the debt burden faced by independent
farmers, cooperatives, and government agencies alike; and
the dearth of credit for agricultural investments.  All of
these issues influence the ability and willingness of
farmers and farmers’ organizations, like the Shu WUA, to
take over responsibility for the irrigation system.
Barter
According to both farmers and local officials, in-kind
payments and trades constitute a  large share of the
agricultural economy in Shu Raion.  Farmers pay for their
inputs in kind and use barter to obtain the consumer goods
they need; the UVS pays its employees in kind and obtains
fuel and other supplies through barter.  
The most common unit of barter is a ton of wheat,
although many other goods are also traded.  In 1998,
Jhambyl Cooperative Farm produced 1,485 tons of wheat.
Of this, 340 tons was traded for fuel, 200 tons was
distributed to cooperative members as their salaries, and
some went to the UVS in payment for water.  The rest was
used to pay off the cooperative 's debt and for spare parts
for equipment.  
A ton of wheat is valued at 6,400 Tenge ($80) as a barter
good.  When a cooperative worker receives wheat from
the cooperative, in lieu of salary, he or she may consume
it, trade it for other goods, or sell it at the market in Shu,
either as wheat or as flour.  At the market in Shu, families
can sell their wheat for 5 Tenge/kg, or 5,000 Tenge/ton
($62).  The end consumer thus receives goods worth only
78 percent of their nominal value— without taking into
account the transaction costs incurred in receiving, storing,
transporting, and selling each ton of wheat.
A similar calculus applies to barley, another crop that is
used for barter.  The cooperative farms sometimes pay for
water in barley, valued at 8 Tenge/kg, which is the price
that the cooperatives negotiated with the UVS.  The UVS,
in turn, passes the barley on to an employee as part of his
or her salary, again at a value of 8 Tenge/kg.  If the
employee decides to sell the barley at the market, rather
than consuming it or bartering it for other goods, the price
will be only 5 Tenge/kg.  UVS workers' salaries are thus
worth less than two thirds of their nominal rates.
The WUA farmers, whose hay and melons were rejected
as payment for water by the UVS, then offered wheat
flour, at a rate of 17 Tenge/kg.  The UVS accepted this
offer, despite the fact that the market price for flour is only
12-16 Tenge/kg.  The WUA members pay for fuel, which
is their other major purchased input, in cash.
There appears to be very little cash in  the agricultural
economy in Shu.  The UVS does receive some cash from
independent farmers and the WUA, but the UVS engineer
estimated that cash payments total only 10,000-15,000
29
Tenge each year.  When the UVS needs inputs for its own
operations, it accepts them as payment for water bills.  For
example, the UVS receives fuel from the coopera tive
farms, which have obtained their own supply of fuel
through barter.
There are several possible explanations for this reliance on
barter in Shu Raion— and throughout Kazakhstan and the
rest of the former Soviet Union.  Farmers are short of cash
and lack access to credit, and, as the only producers of
value in the system, they can insist that suppliers accept
barter values that are higher than market values.  The use
of barter also permits the farmers to avoid taxes, which
would be incurred on cash receipts.  Those who lose the
most from the inflated barter values—the workers who
receive the barter goods in place of their  salaries—have
little bargaining power, since they know that they will not
in any case receive cash.15
Debt
Because farmers have no money to pay for inputs and do
not produce enough to cover all their expenses through
barter, both farms and the U VS have substantial debts.
The Jhambyl Cooperative Farm currently owes 5 million
Tenge ($62,500) in back taxes, as well as 0.5 million
Tenge ($6,250) to vendors for fuel and other inputs.
There is also an inherited debt of 700 tons of wheat owed
to the state from 1994.  One consequence of the
cooperative’s large debt is that the real value of shares in
the farm's capital stock is probably effectively zero, and
might be negative. 
The Shu Water User Association still owes the UVS about
179,000 Tenge ($2,237) for water.  The WUA does not
have any other debts, but some of the individual farmers
owe back taxes to the state.  The UVS, which does not
have to pay for water from the reservoir but must re ly
entirely on farmers' water payments for its operating
budget, is deeply in debt.  As noted above, the amount
owed to the UVS for water delivered from 1996 to  1998
is 35 million Tenge ($437,000)--equivalent to its operating
budget for about two years.  The UVS, in turn, owes 3
million Tenge to its own employees, and it has simply
stopped performing basic maintenance on the irrigation
system.
Credit
No issue is of greater concern to the members of the Shu
WUA than credit.  Farmers in Shu have almost no access
to credit, and none at all to long-term credit.  The only
source of credit available, according to WUA members, is
from the raion agricultural bank.  Farmers can borrow up
to 50,000 T enge for six months at an interest rate of 1
percent per month.  Most are not interested in credit on
these terms, however, because six months is not enough
time to make a profit on an investment.  The six WUA
members who accepted the short-term credit used the
funds for recurrent costs— seeds, fuel, equipment
rental—rather than long-term investment.  They did not
obtain significantly higher yields as a result, and some are
now having difficulty with repayment.  
None of the WUA members has savings of his own, and
they stated unambiguously that their lack of access to
long-term credit is the most serious obstacle they face.
They believe that long-term credit—three years is the term
they would like—would solve many of their problems.
They said they have many ideas for improving the
profitability of their farms—such as developing small food
processing facilities, coordinating purchase and marketing
activities, and producing their own seed—but that their
hands are tied without access to long-term credit.  It is not
clear how carefully they have considered their own ability
to repay long-term loans, however.
CONCLUSIONS
Although the establishment of the Shu WUA was just one
very small step forward for Kazakhstan’s farmers, the
experience of the Shu W UA has a number of implications
for irrigation management transfer in Kazakhstan.
Perhaps the most valuable outcome of this case study is
the discovery that the Shu Water User Association is
working.  While it might be modest in its size and
ambitions, it is successfully performing the basic task for
which it was created.  The farmers’ willingness to pay the
hydrotechnician to regulate water delivery and to take
some responsibility for canal maintenance indicates quite
clearly that the W UA is providing some net benefits to the
farmers.  They recognize the necessity of having an
association to manage their secondary canal, and they
seem to be reasonably satisfied with the W UA’s
performance.  
On the other hand, although the WUA is surviving, it
would be hard to claim that it is flourishing.  It has not
paid for any water this year and, as a result, has had its
water deliveries cut off twice.  The WUA does not have
procedures in place for dealing with non-payment by
individual members, and so far the farmers have not been
willing to cut off water deliveries to their neighbors or take
other actions to compel payment.  Moreover, although
they rely on its services, the farmers seem to regard the
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WUA more as a necessary evil than as an institutional
resource.  This might reflect their displeasure at having to
pay water charges to the UVS, which they do not believe
is fulfilling its responsibilities, or it might simply reflect an
aversion to anything that reduces their new-found
independence.  Either way, it suggests that water user
associations, on their own, cannot change farmers’
attitudes towards water charges and the government’s
water management agencies.  
Another interesting finding is the attitude of the WUA
members toward privatization of the secondary canal that
serves their farms.  They consider the financial value of
the canal to be nil, and they are not willing to give even
their virtually worthless shares in the cooperative farm’s
capital stock in exchange for it.  The farmers see
rehabilitation of the secondary canal as a government
responsibility and not their own.  This view might make
them somewhat reluctant to accept the kind of loans
currently being prepared by international lenders, which
requires farmers to repay the costs of infrastructure
rehabilitation as well as the full costs of operation and
maintenance.
The fact that most farms in Kazakhstan are loss-making is
widely known.  Policy makers and international lenders
may be less keenly aware, however, of the obstacles facing
efforts to introduce full-cost pricing of irrigation water.
The members of the Shu WUA are either unable or
unwilling to pay even the current low level of water
charges and believe that they bear no responsibility for the
cost of rehabilitating the irrigation system.  So far, they
have successfully forced the UVS, and perhaps other
suppliers, to accept barter prices that are above the market
prices of their goods.  In any case, a certain amount of
skepticism is due to proposals to raise current water
charges significantly without first providing the credit the
farmers believe they need to increase their output.
The farmers know that expanding the W UA’s activities,
either by increasing its role in irrigation system
maintenance or by using it to coordinate purchasing and
marketing, would  be beneficial.  While they talk of doing
this next year, they do not seem to have any definite plans
or strong aspirations in this regard.  On the other hand,
there is a good deal of momentum in Shu Raion toward the
creation of independent peasant farms.  Many people
regard the demise of Jhambyl Cooperative Farm as
inevitable and just a matter of time.  The cooperative’s
landholdings and human capital base are shrinking, as the
workers who have the resources and ambitions leave to
establish their own farms, but its debts are not.  It seems
likely that at some point the cooperative will simply
vanish.
The Shu Water User Association was one of the first two
WUAs in all of Kazakhstan.  It has only 37 members and
an area of 450 hectares—far fewer than the hundreds of
members and thousands of hectares that are envisioned for
the WUAs being set up by international lenders in other
districts of Kazakhstan.  We were encouraged by the
discovery that the Shu WUA has survived for two years
and is providing benefits to its members, as well as by the
fact that independent farmers are doing re latively well in
Shu Raion.  We saw little sign, however, that the farmers
who established the W UA share the international lenders’
vision of the future.  The farmers hold the government
responsible for providing a sound irrigation system, and
they believe they do not have the resources to pay more
for water or infrastructure.  Offering the farmers a source
of short-term production credits and medium-term capital
credits at a modest interest rate might change their attitude
toward irrigation privatization.  Whether they will then
also be willing and  able to  repay loans used to  rehabilitate
the irrigation system is another question.
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ENDNOTES
1 Burger (1998) provides a good overview of the current status of irrigation management transfer in Kazakhstan.
2 There is a good deal of confusion in Kazakhstan over the use of the terms "association" and "organization."  Many
international experts have concluded that groups of irrigators should be termed "water user organizations," rather
than "water user associations," to avoid confusion with the legal meaning of "association" under Kazakhstani civil
law.  In this case study, we retain the commonly-used term "water user association," but it should be kept in mind
that we are not using it in the Kazakhstani legal sense.
3 A Sovkhoz was a Sovmestnoe Khozaystvo, or state-owned collective farm.
4 Agricultural land in Kazakhstan cannot be privately owned.  Instead, during privatization farmers received 99-year
leases for their land.  These leases can be bought and sold, as if they were private property.  The state, however,
retains the right to re-take land that has not been used for its intended purpose for three years.  There have been no
land sales to date in Shu Raion. The farms we refer to as “independent” have the legal status of peasant farms under
Kazakhstani law.
5 A “production cooperative” is one of several possible commercial entities suitable for large farms under
Kazakhstani civil law.  A production cooperative is essentially a worker-owned collective farm.  By law, all the
members of a production cooperative have equal rights in managing the farm, are required to work on the farm, and
are guaranteed work and wages. The production cooperative is thus a relatively inflexible format for making the
transition from a Sovkhoz to a market-based commercial venture.  It was one of the most popular corporate structures
adopted by former state farms, at least in part because it continues to provide job security to all workers, including
managers (Gaynor 1996). The Jhambyl Cooperative Farm has an elected  chairman whose term in office is indefinite. 
The recently elected  chairman, who  was previously the chief government official (Akim ) of the village, might hold
his position for life if he does a good job.
6 The average wheat yield  for Kazakhstan in 1998  was 0.6 tons/hectare, down from 0.86 tons/hectare in 1997. 
Drought is blamed for this year’s poor yields (Central Asian Post, 10/26/98).  For comparison, the average wheat
yield in Australia in 1998 was 1.9 tons/hectare (FAO 1998).
7 The exchange rate in October, 1998  was approximately 80 Tenge/U.S. dollar, and that is the rate used in this paper.
8 In addition to the water charges levied by the UVS, the government of Kazakhstan began this year to levy a tax on
“water as a natural resource.”   For agricultural water  users in Shu Raion, this tax is currently 0.0331 T enge/m3.  It is
collected by the district tax inspectorate, not by the UVS.
9 HIID  provided  grants to  two groups of farmers in Kazakhstan to serve as p ilot WUAs.  Shu was selected both
because it was under consideration for a  future W orld Bank irrigation and drainage rehabilitation loan and because it
was the home district of one member of HIID’s local working group on WUA development, who provided  contacts
with local officials and credibility among farmers.
10 There  is no annual registration fee, but the farmers will have to re-register their organization in five years.
11 The charge for water in 1998  was 0.0492 Tenge/m3, as was mentioned above.  At this rate, the 2 million m3
received by the WUA should have cost 98,400 T enge.  The reason for this discrepancy is unclear.
The research for this paper was carried out under the Environmental Policy and Institutions for Central Asia Pro ject, a
project of the U.S. Agency for International Development.
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12 The farmers we interviewed said that they will have to begin paying the tax on water as a natural resource next
year, although co llection of the tax officially began this year and some farmers in other regions are already paying it.
13 The farmers do not use purchased fertilizers or pesticides on any of their crops except melons, which they treat
with herb icides. 
14 Old, heavily used Russian-made cars, such as Ladas, can be purchased for as little as $100 in Kazakhstan.
15 ADB  (1998) argues that it is tax evasion, and not the lack of liquidity, that is the main reason for using barter.  In
our interviews, however, we heard relatively few complaints about taxes, and many about the lack of liquidity.  For a
different approach to explaining the use of barter  in former Soviet economies, see Gaddy and Ickes (1998). 
